HYDRO-HEGEMONY

a Framework for Analysis of Transboundary Water Conflicts

Water Conflict, Security and Cooperation
HEI Genève, 5 Dec 2006

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“without a good water conflict theory, we are doomed to myopia - no matter how insightful the occasional analysis”

(Frey and Naff, 1985).

(incomplete) list of theory relevant to Transboundary Water

Frey and Naff  Power/Interests/Position Matrix (1985)

Lowi  Theory of Hegemonic Cooperation (1993)

Homer-Dixon  Environmental Determinism (1996, 1999)

Allan  Virtual water (2001)

Gleick  Water as a means / tool / target of conflict (2001+)

Wolf +  Water Conflict Prevention, Water Dispute Database

Turton +  Hydropolitical Complex Theory / Securitisation (2002)

Allouche  Hydro-Nationalism (2005)
How Important is...

Riparian Position?

Catchment Area?

Law or Treaties?
How Important is... 
Riparian Position? 
Catchment Area? 
Law or Treaties?

POWER
FRAMEWORK OF HYDRO-HEGEMONY

considers two features:

A. Intensities of Conflict and Cooperation
   - The absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict
   - Existence of a treaty does not mean cooperation

B. Influence of Power
   - Power determines the outcome of the conflict, its intensity, and its nature
   - Power is the reason water conflicts linger unresolved
A. Intensity of Conflict

The absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict

(building on Yoffe et. al.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Voluntary Unification into one nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Major Strategic Alliance (International Freshwater Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Military, Economic or Strategic Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Non-military Economic, Technological or Industrial Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cultural or Scientific Support (non-strategic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Official Verbal Support of goals, values, or regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Official Exchanges, Talks or Policy Expressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Neutral or non-significant acts for the inter-nation situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Mild Verbal Expressions displaying discord in interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Strong Verbal Expressions displaying hostility in interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>Diplomatic-Economic Hostile Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>Political-Military Hostile Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-5</td>
<td>Small Scale Military Acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-6</td>
<td>Extensive War Acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-7</td>
<td>Formal Declaration of War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. (cont.) Qualifying Cooperation

The existence of a treaty does not mean ‘cooperation’

(Wolf → Conca → Gleditsch → Kistin)
What is the utility of treaties on the Ganges? on the Jordan? Tigris?

Is a ‘joint committee’ the same as ‘partnership’?

What is the influence of a treaty over transboundary resource management?

Is ‘cooperation’ even the goal?

(😊 ➔ 😞)
B. Influence of Power
### Three Dimensions of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Features*</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Power</td>
<td>Coercion, Force</td>
<td>ability to <em>mobilize capabilities</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


I am talking of millions of men who have been skilfully injected with fear, inferiority complexes, trepidation, servility, abasement…  

Aimé Césaire

Is it not the *supreme exercise of power* to get …others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?  

Lukes
Multiple layers of hegemony (Warner)

• Global level:
  • Control of discourse, institutions, rules

• Regional level
  • Territorial control, identity

• Basin level
  • Resource control

• State level
  • Control of population, unity
Potential Interactions over transboundary waters:

Shared Control ↔ Consolidated Control ↔ Contested Control

Cooperative ↔ Competitive (but stifled) ↔ Competitive (and cut-throat)

**Methods of CONTROL:**
Resisting Hegemony

Some options available to ‘weaker’ states:
Abstract Model of Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony

Hegemony

Consent
Sanctioned Discourse

Status quo maintenance

Co-option

S

External backup

Status quo - challenge

Alternatives

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ETHIOPIA Challenging Hegemony

_Inverted Triangle_ – How to challenge Hydro-Hegemony?

**Goal**
- **SHARED CONTROL**

**Strategies**
- Water infrastructures construction
- Economic and institutional development
- Social and political adaptive capacities

**Political feasibility**
- Reactive and Active Diplomacy
- Reinforced cooperation
- Knowledge/expertise construction
- Claim for legal principles
- Discourse alternatives
- Needs-approach
- Desecuritisation
- Financial mobilisation

**Tactics**
- Reactive and Active Diplomacy
- Reinforced cooperation

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CASE STUDY

The Palestinian – Israeli Water Conflict
STRUCTURAL POWER
(power as might: capability)
- Economic: 10
- Military: 9
- International Support: 8
- Financial Mobilization: 10
- Human Capital: 8
- Riparian Position: 5

ISRAEL
PALESTINE

BARGAINING POWER
(power as a relationship: legitimacy)
- Legitimacy: 5
- Agreements / Obligations: 5
- Moral High Ground / Law: 5
- Agenda-Setting: 10

ISRAEL
PALESTINE

IDEATIONAL POWER
(power in the realm of ideas)
- Ability to shape issues: 9
- Ability to shape perceptions: 9
- Ability to sanction the discourse: 10
- 'Power Reputation' / deterrence: 10

ISRAEL
PALESTINE
Steps taken to gain control over groundwater:

1967
- Military Conquest
  - 3 military orders (resource capture strategy)

1967–96
- Occupation
  - Dual development of West Bank: min. for Palestinians, max. for settlers (resource capture strategy)

1996
- “Oslo II” Agreement
  - Containment strategy (cementing facts on the ground)

Joint Water Committee
- License Issuing Procedures

- Issuing License
  - IDF Civ. Admin. approval - Area C

- JWC approval for Area A, B
  - Israeli prelim. approval

- Palestinian prelim. approval

72% of West Bank
STRATEGIES and TACTICS used for Control of Transboundary Waters

Shared Control ↔ Consolidated Control ↔ Contested Control

(from Figure 7.1)

Goal

CONSOLIDATED CONTROL

Strategies

A. RESOURCE CAPTURE
B. CONTAINMENT

Tactics

(I) MILITARY FORCE
(II) COVERT ACTIONS
(III) COERCION-PRESSURE
(IV) ACTIVE STALLING
(I) INCENTIVES
(III) TREATIES
(IV) SECURITISATION
(IV) KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION
(IV) SANCTIONING THE DISCOURSE

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
FINANCIAL MOBILIZATION
HUMAN CAPITAL
RIPARIAN POSITION

Coercive Resources

International Context: weak International Water Law; global political trends
CONCLUSIONS OF CASE STUDY:

a) Current utilistation is ‘inequitable’ and ‘unreasonable’

b) Conflict exists, even if it is hidden

c) Intensity and outcome of conflict is determined in large part by power (not law or fair sharing)

d) The situation of hegemony may be obscuring our analysis as much as it prevents resolution of the conflict.

e) ‘Domination dressed up as cooperation’ (Selby)
Summing-up
the HH Analysis
• POWER (3 dimensions) has influence over:
  • Outcome
  • Analysis
  • Perception
  • Cooperative processes

• Conflict and Cooperation exist simultaneously (but extent of each is determined by hegemon)

• Cooperation must be qualified (existence of a treaty does not mean cooperation)

• Conflicts linger unresolved
Policy Implications / Future Areas of Research:

• Other Water Conflicts / Other Types of Water Conflict  (*large n study*)

• Towards Water ‘cooperation’:
  • International Water Law  (*levelling the playing field*)
  • Unpacking ‘cooperation’
  • Hydropolitical Complex Theory
  • Counter Hegemony / Resisting Hegemony

*Thank-you.*